Despite a large body of research on the influences of religion on family life and gender ideology, few studies examined how religion affects work-family strategies. One set of strategies involves making employment or family trade-offs-strategies of devoting time or attention to either work or family in a situation in which one cannot devote the preferred amount of time and attention to both, strategies that may be experienced as making sacrifices, hard choices, or accommodations. Using 1996 General Social Survey data, the authors analyze how religion affects employment and family tradeoffs. They develop hypotheses about the institutional effects of religious involvement and effects of involvement in a conservative religious subculture. They find that religious involvement and religious subculture shape trade-offs in gender-specific ways, and that religion affects more of men's trade-offs. They conclude by calling for further research on the social sources of cultural frameworks that shape men's and women's work-family strategies.
Work-family strategies are practical routines of action that coordinate paid employment and family life (Moen & Wethington, 1992) . Work-family strategies involve the exercise of agency within structural constraints and are best understood as choices made within a limited range of options and under conditions that systematically privatize the costs of work-family management (Becker & Moen, 1999) . For many people today, individual or couple-level work-family strategies are the only practical means of achieving this coordination because "family-friendly" policies are not always utilized, even when available (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2002; Eaton, 2003) . Relatively little attention has been paid to how religion shapes work-family strategies. This is surprising, given that religion is an important source of the moral frameworks that shape understandings of appropriate gender roles and ideal family arrangements (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999) . We investigate religious effects on men's and women's work-family strategies, with a particular focus on what Meninno and Brayfield (2002) 
called employment and family trade-offs.
In recent decades managers and professionals have been spending increasingly long hours at work (Bluestone & Rose, 1997 Clarkberg & Moen, 2001; Figart & Golden, 1998; Hochschild, 1997; Jacobs & Gerson, 1998; Schor, 1991) , whereas other workers have experienced chronic economic insecurity and underemployment (Schor, 1991) .
Whether due to time constraints or the demands of a job that may not be family friendly but is too precious to lose, the work-family strategies of many men and women today involve trade-offsstrategies of devoting time or attention to either work or family in a situation in which one cannot devote the preferred amount of time and attention to both. Mennino and Brayfield (2002) identified two elements of trade-offs of particular interest for work-family scholars: They defined employment trade-offs as sacrifices people make in their job or career because of their family responsibilities, and family tradeoffs as compromises people make in their family lives because of the responsibilities of paid work. The use of terms such as compromise or sacrifice to denote trade-offs highlights the structural constraints that shape these choices (cf. Becker & Moen, 1999; Moen & Wethington, 1992) .
The current study examines the behavioral trade-offs that people make in managing their work and family commitments. 1 We used data from the 1996 General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2005) , which contains several measures of employment and family trade-offs, all of which focus on choices or decisions about allocating time to work and family life-decisions to refuse overtime or a promotion, to cut back or add hours at work, to miss a family event, or to reduce time spent on house tasks or caregiving. Previous research has highlighted how gender, family demands, employment demands, and human capital shape men's and women's work-family strategies more generally and, in particular, family and employment trade-offs (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Hinze, 2000; Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . In our analysis we controlled for the effects of factors that were identified in previous research and we explored whether religious beliefs and commitments have an effect on family and employment trade-offs net of these other factors.
Blair-Loy (2003) and Gerson (2002) argued that work-family strategies are embedded in larger cultural frameworks that apportion the moral obligations of paid work and family caretaking among members. In the United States, religious traditions are important sources of family ideals and gender norms (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999) . In particular, the conservative Protestant religious subculture is characterized by discourses that make specific claims about the gendered nature of women's and men's obligations to work and to family, identifying the ideal arrangement as the woman as caretaker and the man as breadwinner (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Wilcox, 2004) . We explored whether and how religion influences work-family strategies. We identified institutional features common among mainstream religious groups in the United States that may have an effect on workfamily strategies for those who are religiously involved. 2 We also identified features associated with conservative Protestant religious subculture that may influence work-family strategies in distinctive ways for those involved in that subculture. We generated hypotheses about the effects of institutional and subcultural aspects of religion on employment and family trade-offs in analyses that control for other factors previously shown to shape these trade-offs. To investigate whether religion shapes gender-specific work-family trade-off patterns, we generated analyses for male and female subsamples.
Structural Constraints on Trade-Offs
Previous research has focused largely on the structural constraints that shape how men and women make employment and family trade-offs by analyzing the factors that make some jobs-and some families-more demanding than others. Professional and managerial jobs are more demanding in that they require longer hours of work (plus "face time") and have strict career ladders that mean that scaling back on hours or refusing a promotion entails a significant sacrifice in career trajectory (Blair-Loy, 2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997) . Family demands also vary with the presence of younger and older children and other obligations such as an elderly or ill relative (Eriksen & Gerstel, 2002; Hochschild, 1989) . All things being equal, those with more demanding jobs are expected to make more family trade-offs, and those with more family demands are expected to make more employment trade-offs (Franklin, Ames, & King, 1994; Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002; Moen & Dempster-McClain, 1987) . Of course, all things are seldom equal. Human capital, or higher levels of education, training, and work experience, can increase one's power to resist employment demands (Barnett & Lundgren, 1998; Buck, Lee, MacDermid, & Smith, 2000) .
All of these factors-job demands, family demands, and human capital-are factors that may affect men and women; however, none of them operates in a gender-neutral way. Gender is an aspect of the self-gendered identities, gendered beliefs, and attitudes-and something that pervades and structures social institutions (Hall, 1993; Martin, 2003; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . Gender, then, is developed through routines of interaction, and through the way that resources (such as jobs and human capital) are distributed. Gender as a social institution is a kind of constraint on agency, a structural influence on the choices people face in developing work-family strategies. It is unclear whether men and women experience work-family conflict at about the same rates or if there are gender differences (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Wethington, 1989; Frone, Russell, & Cooper, 1992; Grzywacz, Almeida, & McDonald, 2002; Gutek, Searle, & Klepa, 1991) . However, overall, the workfamily strategies they use differ. Women are more likely to make employment trade-offs, take responsibility for family demands, and adjust their employment careers around their family's needs (Hochschild, 1989; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002; Moen & Sweet, 2003) , choices that reproduce a structure of gender inequality as women accrue lower lifetime earnings and occupational attainment than do men. And for women who do choose to invest in more human capital and pursue more workcentered lives, research suggests that this leads to more family trade-offs than the same choices lead to for men (Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997) .
In one sense it is entirely appropriate to treat gender as a structural constraint on employment and family trade-offs. The structure of gender inequality, for example, is what makes women "pay more" for making the same choices that men make; women who put career first really do bear more familyrelated costs than do men with similar human capital (Blair-Loy, 2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997) , and the cultural ideal of the male breadwinner really does shape career ladders in a way that makes a certain understanding of work-oriented masculinity a structural reality and a cultural norm. However, it also makes sense to understand gender as a cultural factor that shapes how people exercise agency, or how people choose to prioritize given the range of options that structural conditions make available to them. Gendered norms of behavior-ideas about who ought to care for the family or who ought to spend longer hours on the job-are developed through gendered cultural frameworks that influence behavior. These cultural aspects of gender are often measured through gender ideology scales, and for men and women, gender ideology has a direct influence on employment and family trade-offs (Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . We argue that religion is another cultural factor that we need to take into account as we analyze how people exercise their agency-how they make choices-given the structural constraints they face.
Religious Influences on Employment and Family Trade-Offs
Religion provides cultural frameworks that specify who ought to care for the family or who ought to work long hours to support the family. Religion and family are intertwined and interdependent institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003 Edgell, , 2005 Houseknecht & Pankhurst, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999) . Religious involvement is associated with attitudes about family and gender and shapes how men and women invest their time and their identity in their roles as husband or wife, mother or father (Lehrer, 1996; Sherkat, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004) . There has been little work on how religion shapes work-family strategies; however, other work on the influence of religion on marital decision making suggests we cannot assume that religious ideals influence behavior, including workfamily trade-offs, in a direct and straightforward way (Denton, 2004) .
We identified two different ways in which religious involvement may shape employment and family trade-offs for men and women. First, we argue that involvement in any mainstream religious institution may have an institutional effect on how men and women make employment or family trade-offs. We use the term institutional to indicate features that characterize the institutional field of mainstream religious groups in the United States and are common across the organizations within it (cf. Becker, 1999; Warner, 1993; Wilcox, Chaves, & Franz, 2004) . One common feature of American religious institutions is the centrality of religious familism-the ideology that the family is the precious, central unit of social order, and that family life should be governed by religious moral imperatives (Bendroth, 2002; Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003 Edgell, , 2005 Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004; Wuthnow, 1998) . It is this widespread and shared religious familism, manifested in religious discourse and institutionalized routines of ministry cf. Edgell, 2003 cf. Edgell, , 2005 , that leads scholars to identify familism as an institutional feature of American religious institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003 Edgell, , 2005 Wilcox et al., 2004) .
How might religious familism affect how people make employment or family trade-offs? As early as the 1950s, sociologists pointed to the role of churches as a primary means through which people lived out a familyoriented lifestyle, in contrast with a lifestyle based on careerism or consumerism (Bell, 1958; Bendroth, 2002; Wuthnow, 1998) , and a recent study finds that across religious traditions congregational leaders still encourage members to spend less time at work and more time with family, and to reject the careerism and materialism that lead to overwork (Edgell, 2005) . This leads to our first hypotheses about institutional religious effects on employment and family trade-offs:
Hypothesis 1a: People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are more likely to make employment trade-offs to spend time with family than those who are not as involved in these institutions.
Hypothesis 1b:
People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are less likely to make family trade-offs because of work demands than those who are not as involved in these institutions.
We used church attendance as our measure of religious involvement in mainstream religious institutions because participation in a local congregation is a good indicator for exposure to these institutional effects. In our analyses, we also explored how these institutional religious effects may vary according to one's family status, especially marriage and the presence of children. These two hypotheses are framed as gender neutral because many studies suggest that religious familism operates as a cultural framework that encourages men and women to "put family first" in their investment of time (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003 Edgell, , 2005 Wuthnow, 1998) . However, by separating our analyses of men's and women's tradeoffs we can investigate whether these effects are in fact gender neutral or gender specific.
We also investigate whether involvement in a conservative Protestant religious subculture has a particular effect on how men and women make choices regarding employment and family trade-offs. In the United States, conservative Protestant religious subcultures continue to uphold a traditionally gendered division of labor in the home as a moral ideal and base this on interpretations of the Bible that not only support the idea of the man as the "spiritual head" of the family but also manifest an understanding of men and women's natures as essentially different (Bendroth, 2002; Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Woodberry & Smith, 1998) . And this has some effects on behavior. Some religiously conservative women restructure their labor-force participation around home demands, although the only large-scale study to date has found that these effects disappear when controlling for a range of human capital and labor market factors (cf. Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 2000) . Conservative Protestant husbands tend to do less housework than their secular or liberalreligious counterparts (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004) .
On the other hand, conservative Protestant discourse about the ideal family is coupled with a kind of pragmatic egalitarianism in marriage (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Hochschild, 1989) ; Denton (2004) found that in marital decision making about work, childrearing, and finances, conservative and liberal Protestants are not all that different. Moreover, a considerable amount of time and attention is given in conservative religious groups to fostering men's involvement in the home; groups such as Promise Keepers and church-based men's fellowship groups encourage men to develop the skills necessary to form loving relationships with their wives and a caring and involved style of parenting (Bartkowski, 2004; Singleton, 2003) . Wilcox (2004) argued that this has a direct influence on men's decisions to spend more time with their families.
Because the cultural framework of religious conservatives emphasizes gender-specific roles in the family and essential differences in men's and women's natures, we develop gender-specific hypotheses about the effects of this subculture on employment and family trade-offs. For women, this is relatively straightforward:
Hypothesis 2: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant women will make more employment trade-offs than nonconservative Protestant women and more than conservative Protestant men.
Conservative Protestant women may make more employment trade-offs because of their desire to live up to the traditionally gendered ideal of the mother as caretaker upheld by their religious subculture. Being a conservative Protestant may affect women's trade-off behaviors over and above the influence of personal gender ideology.
For men, we developed competing hypotheses to test whether men are more influenced by the official gender ideology of their religious subculture, which emphasizes their role as provider and head of the household, or whether they are more influenced by the pragmatic egalitarianism and emphasis on men's involvement in the family that some have identified in the daily practices of religious conservatism in the United States:
Hypothesis 3a: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant men will make more family trade-offs and fewer employment trade-offs than other men, and fewer than conservative Protestant women.
Hypothesis 3b: Conservative Protestant men will make more employment trade-offs than other men because they understand this as fulfilling the moral imperative to be more involved in their family life.
We tested whether the traditional gender ideology present in conservative Protestant religious subcultures encourages men to pursue their role as the family provider and delegate more of the family caretaking to their wives.
For men and woman, it may be that conservative religious views on gender are only partly captured by traditional gender ideology scales, and/or that conservative Protestantism provides support for men in transferring their gender beliefs into action. In assessing all of these hypotheses, we assess participation in a conservative Protestant subculture by one's identification with a conservative religious denomination, using the standard religious affiliation item from the General Social Survey (Davis et al., 2005) . As with church attendance, we investigated whether the effects of religious subculture interact with family status.
In summary, scholars who study work-family strategies have begun to emphasize the importance of analyzing cultural frameworks that shape understandings of gender today, including contemporary understandings of who is responsible for paid work and for family caretaking. We know quite a lot about how structural constraints shape work-family strategies; however, we believe a thorough understanding must include a consideration of structural constraints and the cultural frameworks that shape the choices that men and women do have. Religion has a formative influence on family life in the United States and is a primary cultural arena in which moral claims about gender and family are elaborated. However, few studies have examined whether and how religion influences the choices that men and women make when faced with the choices that contemporary structural arrangements make available, including the need to balance potentially conflicting demands or allocate scarce time. No studies have examined this question with the range of measures that we employed here, which assess multiple kinds of employment and family trade-offs using a nationally representative data set.
This article begins the work of exploring how religious claims about moral responsibility for family caretaking and providing influence the behavior of contemporary men and women who face choices about investing time in work and family life. At the same time, our analyses are also sensitive to how structural constraints influence the strategies that men and women adopt. By identifying gender-specific and gender-neutral moral claims made by religious groups, we go beyond the sole focus on conservative religious subculture that has characterized much of the recent work on religion and gender to facilitate a broader understanding of the links between religion and work-family trade-offs.
Method and Data
We used data from the Gender Module of the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS; Davis et al., 2005) . There were 2,904 respondents in the 1996 GSS; however, only 1,460 respondents were surveyed in the Gender Module. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002) , we chose to further limit the current sample to respondents who were working full-time, part-time, or those with a job but who were currently not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike. This reduced the sample size to 994. We then limited the sample to respondents who had valid data on all independent and dependent variables. The exceptions are supervisor status, income, gender ideology, and church attendance (see our discussion of each exception in the Independent Variables section). This eliminated 127 respondents. Our resulting sample was 867, 430 men (49.6%) and 437 women (50.4%).
Previous research has suggested that conservative Protestant women with young children may be more likely to drop out of the labor force entirely until their children enter school (Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 2000) . We checked to see if conservative Protestant women were disproportionately more likely to drop out of our employed subsample and found that they are not. In the full 1996 GSS survey, 20% of respondents are conservative Protestant women; in the GSS Gender Module, 19% of respondents are conservative Protestant women, whereas for the employed subsample, the figure is 16%. Likewise, conservative Protestant women with young children compose 4% of the full 1996 GSS, 4% of the Gender Module, and 4% of our employed subsample.
Analytical Strategy
We perform logistic regression analysis on seven dependent variables that measure discrete workfamily strategies. All seven trade-offs were treated as separate variables and dichotomously coded (yes/no) because we wanted to investigate whether religion had a distinctive effect on particular employment or family trade-offs. 3 Previous studies (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) have treated respondents' gender as an independent variable much like income or educational attainment. We chose, instead, to separate our analyses by gender. This strategy allowed us to determine how the effects of religious subcultures vary by gender. It also eases presentation of our findings and eliminates the need for using three-way interaction terms, which are awkward to interpret because it is hard to convey in a clear and concise way which are the appropriate comparison groups.
Because we were interested in documenting religious effects on trade-offs, we treated as controls the variables on structural constraints (job demands, family demands, human capital) and gender ideology identified in other research as having an effect on employment and family trade-offs (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . To see what effect our religion variables had over and above our controls, we initially ran our models first with controls and then added our religion variables; the results were not substantially different than those presented here. 4 We know that gender ideology and religious affiliation are linked so we checked for these interactions (cf. Gallagher & Smith, 1999) ; we also checked for interaction effects between our religion variables and family structure, following work that suggests that family status and the ages of children may change religious involvement and motivate religious identification (cf. Edgell, 2005) . For ease of presentation, we discuss and show main-effects models only when no interactions were significant.
Dependent Variables
Our seven dependent variables were drawn from the 1996 GSS Gender Module. They measured whether respondents had ever made employment or family trade-offs in their present job because of their family or job responsibilities. Three employment trade-off questions asked respondents whether they had (a) refused a promotion, (b) refused overtime, or (c) cut back on their hours. Respondents were also asked if they had ever made the following family trade-offs: (d) took on additional work, cutting into family time; (e) been unable to do the work they usually did around the house; (f) missed a family occasion or holiday; or (g) been unable to care for a sick child or relative.
Independent Variables
Gender ideology. To measure gender ideology, or beliefs about what men's and women's roles ought to be, we created a scale ranging from 0 to 16 using four popular GSS measures of gender-role beliefs (see Table 1 ). This scale is widely used by scholars, and in our analysis it had an alpha of .76. A higher score on this scale indicates a more conservative gender ideology and a lower score a more egalitarian ideology. To maximize our data, we followed the strategy used by Mennino and Brayfield (2002) and recoded respondents with missing data as having "no opinion."
Job demands. Previous scholars have found that men and women who work longer hours are more likely to make family trade-offs than other workers (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) , and that selfemployment, supervisory status, and occupation are associated with employment tradeoffs (Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . In their analyses, Mennino and Brayfield (2002) found that men and women employed by large firms were less likely to refuse overtime than those who worked at smaller firms. In our models, we included occupation, supervisory status, self-employment status, hours worked per week, and number of employees at the respondent's workplace (firm size) as our job demand variables. Firm size was dummy coded into 0 (less than 100 employees) and 1 (100 or more employees). The majority of the sample was employed at medium-or small-sized firms. Slightly more than one third worked at a firm with more than 100 employees (36%). Respondents worked 42 hours per week on average, with a range of 2 to 89. Self-employment was dichotomously coded from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating that men and women were employees and 1 signaling self-employment. Only 13% were self-employed. Occupation was coded into professional and managerial workers (1) and blue-collar, service, military, and whitecollar workers (0). Professionals or managers composed roughly one third of our sample (32%).
Because a large percentage of GSS respondents did not report their supervisory status we chose not to exclude these individuals from our sample (Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) . Instead, we treated them as a middle "don't know" category and included a dummy variable for missing supervisory status in our analysis. In the sample, 25% of respondents supervised other orkers.
Family demands. We measured family characteristics through three variables: marital status, presence of young children, and school-aged children living in the household. Marital status was dummy coded 1 (married) and 0 (divorced, widowed, separated, never married, and single). Almost one half of the sample were married (48%), 17% had children younger than age 6 living with them, and 22% were living with school-aged children between age 6 and 17 years.
Human capital. We used household income, proportion of income contributed by the respondent, age, and educational attainment as our measures of human capital. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002) , we substituted the midpoint value for each income category and used Pareto's curve (Parker & Fenwick, 1983) to set the last category midpoint to US$103,868.60 for household income and individual income at US$97,462.43. We substituted respondent's individual income for household income if respondents were not married and failed to report their household income. If respondents were married and missing either household or individual income, we substituted the mean income from similar respondents (based on sex and occupation). Eleven percent of our sample did not report household and respondent income. We included them in our income measure and in a separate dummy variable. We calculated the proportion of income that respondents contributed to the household by dividing individual income by household income. Respondents with proportions over 1 (due to missing data reassignment) were excluded from the sample. The average household income was $44,215. The mean respondent age was 41 years with a range of 19 to 83, and most (89%) had at least a high school diploma.
Religion. Our religion variables are religious subculture and church attendance. We dummy coded religious preference into other (0) and conservative Protestant (1), 5 which means that our results contrast conservative Protestants and everyone else (Catholics, Jews, non-Conservative Protestants, and those with other or no religious affiliation). 6 In our sample, 31% of women and 32% of men identified as belonging to a conservative Protestant group. Church attendance was coded from 0 (never) to 8 (several times a week). Rather than exclude a sizable number of respondents with missing data for church attendance, we assigned missing cases the mean church attendance from respondents of their same sex, religious identity, and religiosity (self-reported importance of religion). This boosted our sample by 15 cases. Respondents with missing attendance data that were also missing data on their religiosity or religious identity were excluded from the sample. The mean church attendance for our sample was 3.5 (attended church several times a year). Fourteen percent of our sample never went to church in the past year, 14% went to church every week, and 6% reported attending church several times a week.
Race and region. We controlled for race in our analysis, dichotomously coding it into White and Other. The vast majority of men and women were White (82%). We also controlled for region because there is evidence to suggest that Southerners hold more traditional gender ideology beliefs than men and women living in other regions (Powers et al., 2003; Rice & Coates, 1995) . We dummy coded region into South (1) and Midwest, East, and West (0). Thirty-six percent of the sample lived in the South.
Results

Descriptive Findings
We found that men and women differ in predictable but important ways, specifically in their hours worked and in income (see Table 2 ). On average, women earned less money than men, their earnings constituted a smaller proportion of their household's total income, they were more likely to have missing data for income, and they worked 5 fewer hours per week than men. Women were also more likely to be in managerial or professional occupations and to have higher educational attainments than men. There were slight variations in marital status and gender ideology, and women were more likely to have school-age children than men. Overall, close to one half of our sample were currently married; however, men were slightly more likely to be married (52% vs. 44%) than women. Men were more likely to be White, in supervisory positions at work, more likely to have traditional gender ideology beliefs than women, and went to church less frequently. However, there were no gender differences in men's and women's likelihood of self-identifying as a conservative Protestant.
As Table 3 shows, men are more likely to miss a family event and add additional work than women. Women have higher likelihood of being unable to care for family members. Married men and women are more likely than unmarried respondents to refuse a promotion, refuse overtime, cutback on their workload, add additional work, and to miss caregiving demands. Similarly, respondents with young children are more likely to refuse overtime, be unable to meet their caregiving responsibilities, and be unable to fulfill their home task demands. Men and women that attend church at least once a month or more are less likely to miss a family event than those that attend church less frequently. They are also more likely to cut back on their work. 7 There were no statistically significant differences in family tradeoffs or employment trade-offs by religious subculture. Our results indicate that employment and family trade-off predictors vary by gender, that religion operates in complex ways to affect the likelihood of making these trade-offs, and that a wider range of men's trade-offs are influenced by religion than is true for women. Overall, women's employment tradeoffs are most influenced by work demands and autonomy-especially the choice to be self-employedand not family demands or religion. Women's family trade-offs are influenced by various factors-work demands, family demands, and religion, but also age and their share of household income. For men, the story is different. Men's work-family trade-offs are influenced by family demands and religion, whereas their family demands are influenced by work demands, family demands, and religion.
Women
Among women, we found no support for Hypothesis 1a; religious involvement does not affect women's employment trade-off decisions. However, we did find support for Hypothesis 1b; church attendance, our measure of the institutional effects of religion, does reduce women's likelihood of making two of our four family trade-offs. We found no support for Hypothesis 2; conservative Protestant women are not more likely than other women to make employment trade-offs for the sake of family, although in the model for cutting back on hours at work, the conservative Protestant effect approaches statistical significance. Moreover, conservative Protestant women are more likely to make one of our family tradeoffs, a finding we discuss below. Overall, work demands and autonomy shape women's employment tradeoffs, whereas an assortment of family demands, work demands, human capital, and religion affect women's likelihood of family trade-offs.
Women's employment trade-offs. As shown in Table 4 , we found no support for Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 2 regarding religious influences on women's employment trade-offs. Religious involvement and conservative religious subcultures do not encourage women to make employment tradeoffs. However, the effect of conservative Protestant identity on women's choice to cut back on their hours approaches significance and may warrant further investigation in future research. Family demands and human capital variables also are not strong predictors of employment trade-offs for women; race (being White) does predict women's odds of refusing a promotion. Only one type of family demand is significant, and it is only significant for one employment trade-off of three; women with young children are almost twice as likely to refuse overtime than are women who do not have children younger than age 6 years. Work demands best explain women's likelihood of making employment trade-offs. Women are more likely to refuse a promotion if they are a supervisor and are not in a professional or managerial occupation, and women employed in smaller firms are less likely to refuse overtime than women employed in larger firms. Self-employed women are also more likely to cut back on their work and more likely to refuse overtime. Women's family trade-offs. As Table 4 shows, our findings did not reveal a straightforward story for family trade-offs among women. Family demands, work demands, human capital, and religion all matter, but not in uniform ways across all family trade-offs. Overall, we found support for Hypothesis 1b. When women attend church more frequently, they are less likely to make two types of family trade-offs. Church attendance decreases women's odds of missing a family event.
And though women with young children at home are much more likely to report being unable to do the work they usually do around the house, church attendance ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the impact of young children on women's ability to complete tasks at home. 9 Unexpectedly, our findings indicate that women within conservative religious subcultures are more likely to miss caregiving tasks than women from moderate or liberal religious subcultures. Although this is less true for those with young children, it is still true even for them. We believe that it is possible that conservative Protestant women can rely on their husbands for crisis care of a sick child or relative; however, it is also possible that these women have supportive religious networks that help in such situations.
Work and family demands have an impact on women's family trade-offs. Married women are more likely to take on additional work and to miss caregiving tasks but less likely than unmarried women to miss a family event. Women with young children younger than age 6 years are 5 times more likely to have trouble completing tasks at home, although as mentioned above, church attendance ameliorates this effect somewhat. Women with young children are also more than 5 times more likely to have difficulty with their families' caregiving needs. Work demands also matter for women. Women that work longer hours per week are more likely to have missed home tasks, and to have missed family events. Women supervisors have higher odds of missing family events than women without supervisory duties at work, and professional and managerial women are more likely to have missed home tasks.
Human capital variables were the weakest predictors of women's family trade-offs. Educational attainment, age, and income variables each only significantly fit only one family trade-off variable. Women are more likely to add work if they have less education, and younger women are less likely to miss a family event than older-aged women. Last, women that contribute a larger share of their earnings to the household income have higher odds of missing home tasks because of their work demands. Women who did not report either their household or personal income are also significantly more likely to miss a family event.
Men
As Table 5 indicates, religion has an institutional effect on men's odds of making family trade-offs, supporting Hypothesis 1b; church attendance is also associated for men with cutting back on hours at work; however, as for women, this effect is only significant at the p < .10 level, providing only suggestive support for Hypothesis 1a. Conservative religious subcultures affect men's likelihoods for employment trade-offs, although the effects are mixed and provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Overall, family demands, gender ideology, and religion, rather than work demands and human capital, best predict men's odds of employment trade-offs. Family and work demands and religion best explain men's family trade-offs.
Men's employment trade-offs. Involvement in religious institutions and in conservative religious subcultures encourages men to alter their work involvement but not always in the hypothesized direction. Men from conservative Protestant subcultures are less likely to refuse a promotion. However, men who attend church more frequently or belong to a conservative Protestant subculture are more likely to cut back on hours spent at work; these findings are only marginally significant and should be considered suggestive for future research.
Traditional gender ideology intertwines with religious subculture involvement and church attendance in disparate ways that affect men's odds of employment trade-offs. Men with traditional gender ideology from conservative Protestant subcultures are more likely to refuse a promotion, whereas men with traditional gender ideology that attend church more often have lower odds of cutting back their work involvement. Gender ideology, church attendance, and religious subculture combine to affect men's trade-off behaviors in unique ways. Perhaps most interesting is the insight that for conservative Protestant men, it is those with the most traditional gender ideology who are the most likely to refuse a promotion (make an employment tradeoff), suggesting that the men who are the most influenced by this subculture's moral rhetoric on gender roles are the most likely, in practice, to put career second and family first. This supports Gallagher and Smith's (1999) argument that the traditional gender ideology espoused by conservative Protestants can, in practice, lead to more egalitarian outcomes.
Men with young children are twice as likely to refuse a promotion, twice as likely to refuse overtime, and more likely to cut back on their work than men without young children. Fathers of school-age children are also more likely to cut back on their work. Marital status only significantly predicted one type of employment trade-off. Married men are 2 times more likely to refuse overtime than unmarried men. No work demand or human capital variables were statistically significant; however, marginally significant results indicate that men are more likely to cut back on work when they supervise others and more likely to refuse a promotion when their household income is high. When men work more hours per week they are also less likely to refuse overtime.
Men's family trade-offs. Family demands and work demands have the most influence on men's family trade-offs; however, religious involvement makes married men less likely to miss a family event. Gender ideology, human capital, and religious subculture variables are not significant predictors of men's family trade-offs.
Men were most likely to make family trade-offs if they had heavy family or work demands. Men with young children are more likely to be unable to care for sick family members than men without children younger than age 6 years. If men have supervisory duties at work they have higher odds of missing a family event, are more likely to be unable to care for family members, and have trouble finding time for their home tasks (marginally significant). Professionals or managerial men are also more likely to be unable to take care of their home task responsibilities but are less likely to take on additional work. Men who are self-employed are 2 times more likely to be unable to care for family members than men who were employees, and those that work more hours per week are significantly more likely to miss family events.
Family demands, such as marriage, having children younger than age 6 years, or having school-age children also affected men's family trade-offs. Men have higher odds of adding work when they are married or have school-age children, and married men are twice as likely as unmarried men to miss a family event. However, church attendance interacts with marriage to affect the odds of missing a family event. Married men who attend church frequently are less likely to miss a family occasion than married men who do not attend church as often. Last, men that lived in the South had lower odds of working additional hours than men residing in other regions. Comparisons-Women and Men Relative to men, women's trade-offs are more influenced by the presence of young children and by their share of income. Religious involvement does make women more family oriented; however, participation in a conservative Protestant subculture has no effect on six of women's strategies; and, for the one strategy for which it is significant, it works in the opposite way than was expected. The most striking difference is that women's employment tradeoffs are influenced almost entirely by job demands and autonomy whereas men's are almost unaffected by these factors and are driven by religion and family demands. In comparison with women, job constraints play a different role for men, making them more likely to make family trade-offs in favor of work, whereas for women, job constraints affect their employment tradeoffs the most. Religious involvement does make men more family oriented overall. For those conservative Protestant men who most affirm a traditional gender ideology, participation in that subculture influences is associated with one employment trade-off in favor of their families (refusing a promotion), whereas other conservative Protestant men are less likely to make this trade-off. And church attendance makes married men less likely to miss an important family event.
Comparisons between women and men demonstrate pervasive gender differences in the relative influences of job demands and human capital, family demands, and religion on employment and family trade-offs. They also suggest the utility of using measures that can capture discrete trade-offs because different combinations of factors affect men and women differently for different kinds of choices. Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002) conducted analyses of work-family trade-offs using the 1996 GSS. Whereas Kmec examined only three of the four family trade-offs that we included and did not study employment trade-offs, Mennino and Brayfield studied the same seven work-family strategies that we utilized. In many ways, our results replicate Mennino and Brayfield's findings for the effects of job demands, employment demands, and human capital on employment and family trade-offs and Kmec's results for family trade-offs. Similar to Kmec, we found that hours worked per week and having young children significantly affect the likelihood of missing a family event, being unable to provide care to one's family, and to do regular house tasks. Like Mennino and Brayfield, we found that there was not much difference in employment and family trade-offs between those with conservative and liberal gender ideology and that family demands are significant predictors of family trade-offs. However, because we separated our entire analysis by sex, we found that though men and women look similar in regard to family trade-offs, their predictors of employment trade-offs vary dramatically. Work demands are most significant for women, whereas family demands, gender ideology, and religion affect men's odds for employment trade-offs.
Summary
Discussion and Conclusion
Sociologists of religion often lament that their work on religion and family is not widely taken into account by others who study the family (Ammerman & Roof, 1995; Becker & Hofmeister, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999) . Reviews of the literature on family life (Cherlin, 1996) and work-family management (Spain & Bianchi, 1996) mention religion only in passing or not at all (Perry-Jenkins, Repetti, & Crouter, 2000) . 10 However, family scholars are beginning to call for just such an integration of work across subfields (Daly, 2003; Gerson, 2002) , and research that features such integration is appearing in highprofile journals (Denton, 2004; Myers, 1996; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, & Waite, 1995) . We also believe it is important to integrate the scholarship on religion and family life with scholarship on work-family strategies. With Gerson (2002) , we agree that we must understand more fully how cultural frameworks shape understandings of who is morally responsible for caretaking and financial providing if we are to understand not only the structural constraints that shape available choices but also how the choices we make to reproduce or challenge traditional understandings of gender, work, and family life.
We set out to investigate whether and how religion may influence men's and women's employment and family trade-offs. Although scholars of religion have documented many ways in which religious belief and religious involvement influence family life and understandings of gender roles, little research has explored how religion shapes the choices men and women make about how to invest their time when work and family demands create conflicts or necessitate hard choices, and none of this research draws on recent, nationally representative data and looks at a wide range of employment and family tradeoffs. Although making trade-offs is only one type of work-family strategy, it is an important one in an era of increasing time spent at paid work and workplaces that still tend to take a historically "male" model of work-and career-as the norm.
Our findings support the conclusion that religion does affect some employment and family trade-offs and that religious influences act differently on women and men and depend in part on family status. The inclusion of religion in analyses of work-family trade-offs, we believe, can help scholars better understand men's and women's work and family experiences. For example, the fact that religious influences depend on family status for men and women suggests that religious cultural frameworks affect how men and women interpret the relevance of family demands for their own work-family strategies.
We hypothesized that church attendance would have a gender-neutral effect on men and women, encouraging both to make employment trade-offs and not to make family trade-offs. We found that church attendance makes men and women favor "family-centered" trade-offs. However, our data also reveal that going to church affects men's and women's trade-offs differently, affecting different kinds of decisions and interacting in different ways with family structure. Previous scholarship has paid a great deal of attention to the conservative Protestant subculture, with its explicit, and very public, rhetoric about gender roles and family norms. Our analyses suggest the importance of analyzing the institutional features common across religious traditions in the United States. The familism others have identified as a central feature of mainstream religious institutions does, in fact, shape the choices men and women make.
We also found that conservative religious subcultures do affect some employment and family trade-offs and men's and women's choices differently. However, we did not find strong support for the idea that participation in a conservative religious subculture makes either women or men choose trade-offs in more traditional, less egalitarian ways. With Denton (2004) , we urge caution in assuming that conservative Protestant rhetoric is translated in a straightforward way into patriarchal family practices (cf. Wilcox, 2004) .
Overall, we found that religion has an effect on employment and family trade-offs for men, though being irrelevant to women's employment tradeoffs. Taken together, our religion variables had a significant effect on two of men's trade-offs and three of women's trade-offs; the marginally significant findings for men and women on the influence of religion on cutting back on work hours merit further investigation. In some ways, this pattern of findings is surprising. Spain and Bianchi (1996) argued that work-family management is viewed not only in the academic literature but also in the culture at large as a "woman's issue." For women, it is assumed that influences on employment and family trade-offs begin early in life and stem from multiple sources, being "overdetermined" by structural conditions and cultural frameworks. For men, however, religious institutions may be one of the only contexts that encourage them to lead a family-centered life and to make trade-offs that invest time in family over work (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004) . One might have expected religion to shape men's trade-offs more than it does women's. Our findings suggest that this is not the case but do suggest that religion influences men and women differently.
It is important to note the limitations of the measures available in this data set, as they influence how to interpret our findings and the more general claims we can make. It is impossible to tell who, in our sample, was ever offered a promotion, or who was asked to work overtime. We do not have information about job tenure or know how much autonomy (actual or perceived) workers in our sample have. We also do not know about other family constraints, such as the need to care for aging parents, an increasingly common family demand that is likely to occur just as men and women are in their prime years in employment productivity and achievement. We cannot know if the self-employed chose this option because it offered them more flexibility or if they were making do after a layoff or because they were not able to find firm-based employment after dropping out of the labor force to have a child. Also, this data set does not allow us to examine how men and women may "trade off" investment in career and family over the life course, as a couple-level work-family strategy (Becker & Moen, 1999) .
Our analysis suggests that it is worth taking religious involvement and identity into account in future studies that explore these questions. Another area to be investigated is the effect of religion on subjective trade-offs, which were beyond the scope of the current analysis. Our models of behavioral trade-offs show the strong effects of structural constraints on men's and women's choices; and behavioral trade-offs may be particularly constrained by structural factors. Religion, and cultural frameworks in general, may have a greater effect on subjective trade-offs such as commitment to work or family life, or feelings of satisfaction with employment, marriage, and parenting relationships.
Our analyses support those who are calling for more research into how cultural frameworks influence men's and women's work-family strategies and show that religion should be analyzed more systematically as a source of these cultural frameworks. Most mainstream religious institutions critique the careerism and materialism often associated with a work-oriented life and make moral claims about the need to put family first. Conservative religious subcultures make traditionally gendered moral claims about appropriate work-family strategies for men and women. We believe it is important to continue to examine how men and women seek out and utilize opportunities to express their cultural understandings and moral priorities in their choices about work and family life.
Notes
1. Employment and family trade-offs can have subjective elements, such as reducing or restructuring subjective commitment to paid work or family life, changing expectations for what one can accomplish, or changes in the way one feels about one's job or family (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Pixley & Moen, 2003; Price & Mueller, 1986) . These subjective trade-offs, though important, are beyond the scope of the current analysis.
2. Mainstream denotes the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish organizations that compose the dominant religious establishment in the United States (see Edgell, 1999 , or Wuthnow, 1988 . Mainline refers to a specific group of liberal Protestant denominations (Wuthnow & Evans, 2002) .
3. We also checked to see if the dependent variables scaled together well. The three employment tradeoffs have an alpha of .5584, the four family trade-offs have an alpha of .4764, and all seven variables together have an alpha of .575, confirming our decision to treat these as separate choices in the current analyses.
4. Models available by request.
5. The initial question on religious identification on the General Social Survey (GSS; Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2005) asks the respondents to name their religious preference as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion. Those naming Protestant are then asked "What denomination is that, if any?" that are field-coded into 26 possibilities or into a 27th, "Other, please specify" that is available as a text file. Conservative Protestants are designated from these answers based on the coding scheme used by T. W. Smith (1987) that, for conservative Protestants, yields a classification similar to that recommended by Steensland et al. (2000) .
6. We are particularly interested in whether conservative Protestants have a different profile of employment and family trade-offs than do other respondents because there is a substantial literature on the distinctiveness of this subculture, the thesis of which is that this distinctiveness depends largely on, and is reproduced through, a neo-patriarchal family formation and a traditionally gendered division of labor (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; C. Smith, 1998) . Other scholars of work-family strategies have begun to look for this "conservative Protestant" effect (Denton, 2004) , and we want to expand on and contribute to that investigation. Although this does not allow us to investigate the full range of religious identities and how they relate to employment and family trade-offs, it is a good starting point and one that is appropriate to our data.
7. In the current analyses we treat religious attendance as continuous. For descriptive purposes in this section we report it as dichotomous.
8. Results (t tests) available by request.
9. The women who are most likely to be unable to complete tasks at home are those who attend church rarely and have young children, followed by those who attend church rarely and do not have young children, than by frequent church attenders who have young children. The least likely to be unable to complete tasks at home are women who attend church frequently and do not have young children.
10. See Edgell (2005) for a discussion of why these literatures are not as well integrated as they might be.
